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Dr. Alfred B. Mason
U.S.N.A.B.
Concord, California

Dear Dr. Mason:

I have read with interest your stimulating letter of 26 November. As you know, your concern is shared by a great many of us in Washington.

The many facets of this problem are being considered by various governmental bodies. I am enclosing a copy of the series of papers presented by non-governmental academicians and businessmen before the Subcommittee on Economic Statistics of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States. A full text of my own presentation to that group is also enclosed.

Thank you for your letter and for your interest in this important subject.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director


Enclosures:

1. Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies, Parts I, II and III
2. Statement by Allen W. Dulles to the Joint Economic Committee, dated 13 November 1959

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U.S.N.A.D.
Concord, California
26 November, 1959

Mr. Allen W. Dulles
2430 E. Street
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

I read your report to the Joint Economic Committee (Nov. 13) as presented in U.S. News & World Report.

My business is medicine--and my hobby is driving. In both occupations, I find it pays to be pessimistic. I make it a rule to be always ready for the worst, and I expect the worst. It saves me no end of lethal trouble.

I know your information on the cold war is more complete than mine. I am told, however, that the CIA uses suggestions from private sources--and I am desperately anxious not to finish my days under a "People's Democracy". So I present these few suggestions in the hope that one of them may help my country to survive.

(1) The Soviet Union can eventually defeat us in economic, as well as scientific and political and military races.

My authority for this is "Economic Policy for a Free Society", by Henry C. Simons (University of Chicago Press, 1948). Professor Simons, who is quite highly regarded by a large section of our conservative economists, pointed out that while small units are better suited to generate "the greatest good of the greatest number", they did so only by the discipline of a "consensus", i.e., a free exchange of ideas and value-imperatives in the competitive system. The consensus enforces rules that penalize bigness; without such rules, the bigger units must win any power competition.

The Soviet Union is the biggest monopoly in the world--and the least disciplined by any public opinion, domestic or international. Q.E.D.

(2) The U.S.S.R. cannot be counted upon to forsake any means to its supreme goal of total victory.

This is common sense once the priority of victory is assumed; furthermore, we have not in the past been able to assess totalitarian intentions or capabilities well enough, to justify postulated limits on either. Let us suppose that the economic road to U.S.S.R. victory proves long or hard, or even doubtful at times; the same sort of thinking that called the Hungarian affair a "counterrevolution" and Soviet cold war method "peaceful co-existence", will find plenty of reasons for using other than economic means.

We should not assume from the evidences of strenuous endeavor on proximate goals, that those goals are either necessary or sufficient or even satisfying enough to cause them to abandon any other road to victory. Certainly the Soviet Union has not given up its classic methods of propaganda, infiltration, subversion, and political maneuver.

(3) The last factor the West should gamble its values on, is the power of a dictator's people to enforce its demands for a better life.

This argument is quite popular today; it is a modified version of "erosion of despotism", the hope that unknown forces will modify the intentions of a powerful enemy in our favor.

Somehow, the U.S. never accepts the possibility that this enemy might someday possess both intentions and capability for destroying us. Whichever factor is currently supported by stunning new evidence, the opposite factor is currently hidden by frantic new rationalizations. Right now it is the capability which cannot be denied--so the intentions must be denied instead.

But what does our experience of totalitarian systems tell us? I suggest that from semi-totalitarian Japan, totalitarian Germany, and super-totalitarian Russia we should know two things. (1) Neither scientific sophistication, nor vested interests, nor popular demand for modern goodies, is of any avail against the capabilities and intentions of totalitarian leadership. (2) Unknown Factors in such systems are as thoroughly unfavorable to U.S. values as Known Factors, all things considered. It is almost a Cosmic Law, that each engagement with these systems gives us more unpleasant surprises than pleasant ones.

(4) The Soviet Union is quite capable of popularizing one attitude among its people toward us--and then reversing that attitude in a very short time. Also, the ratio between the time necessary for such reversal, and the time necessary to take protective action (in the light of that information) by us, is an indefinitely decreasing function of time itself.

The problem is something like that of a streetcar motorman. These vehicles could not change course, nor could they stop quickly; if a child or another vehicle darted across its way, the motorman had to watch in horror as his Leviathan ground inexorably to a meeting. The analogy: our pilot gets his information too late to permit useful action on same.

The consequence: our world makes duplicity and double-crossing ever more profitable to any system that cares to use them. No state is better equipped to make such use, than the totalitarian variety with its unlimited freedom of action and its supreme position as regards gathering and protecting intelligence.

(5) Our past ability to anticipate totalitarian moves and protect ourselves accordingly, does not justify any gamble of really important values on our present ability in such lines.

I shall take for my example the "overkill" theory, i.e., when you've got enough to destroy your enemy you can save money on arms races. Behind this theory lie a number of rather questionable assumptions:

(a) Perfect information on the enemy's capabilities. We have to be sure what we've got leaves him no alternative to Peace.

(b) Perfect information on his information-processing. He better be convinced that he has no alternative to Peace.

(c) Perfect information on his motivation. We must be sure that when

faced with peace vs. racial suicide, he'll pick the same alternative that we would.

- (d) Perfect confidence in our own resolution. Can the West, if faced with an arrogant totalitarian gamble, muster the will to confront the enemy with the alternatives "overkill" assumes?

I suggest that these assumptions won't remain all true for all time. But for "overkill" to operate as our economical theorists hope, they must all be true. Considering our past performance in assessing totalitarian intentions and capabilities, not to mention our own powers of resolution, what outcome can this "overkill" policy lead us to?

- (6) Our present arms policy presents an almost unbearable temptation, even for an ordinary conqueror like Napoleon--let alone a totalitarian dictator--to take the short cut of military pressure to world victory.

On October 8, Joseph Alsop presented figures for the atomic striking power of Soviet Russia and America for the next few years:

<u>Year</u>	<u>ICBM's, U.S.</u>	<u>ICBM's, U.S.S.R.</u>
1960	30	100
1961	70	500
1962	130	1,000
1963	130	1,500

Mr. Alsop claimed these were the Government's own figures. He could be wrong, but the picture is entirely consistent with our past experience of totalitarian systems and totalitarian leaders, and democratic systems and democratic leaders.

Once the "overkill" theory is doubted, these figures suggest an entirely different interpretation for the Kremlin's sudden change of attitude at Camp David:

It is likely that the Kremlin, blinded by its slave press, underestimated not the capabilities of the U.S. during the Berlin crisis, but our intentions. The fact is that in Berlin, the West had no alternative to suicide. The President seems to have told the press that should the U.S.S.R. employ any of a number of moves to force us out of Berlin, we could only defend our position by that Impossible War which nobody could survive.

To submit to a Berlin grab, however, was suicide of another kind; for what U.S. citizen, let alone allies or neutrals, could repose any faith in America after surrendering Berlin even though the surrender were made to prevent racial suicide? If the Kremlin did not realize our reaction, Western-trained Communists such as Burgess and MacLean and our own U.S. comrades did. In four more years, they expected U.S. public opinion to evolve (under REAL no-alternative-to-Peace) along the same lines so conspicuous today in Britain; and in this period, two elections would incorporate those attitudes into our decision-making leadership. In four years, Khrushchev could have the entire world for nothing!

Here was the West, a ripe fruit about to drop in their laps for nothing--and there was that idiot Khrushchev, rattling H-bombs in Berlin and risking the entire cause of Communism. It seems to me likely that many messages went from West to East along the lines of "Don't be a damned fool and throw everything away for a Pearl Harbor!"

If so, it makes sense that in the middle of that six-month interval, two top-ranking Communists visited this country and spent most of their time sounding out U.S. decision-making opinion. And that Nikita, at the end of it, insisted on a personal visit which he devoted to the same purpose.

Summing up: wasn't this change in policy the most sensible thing for Khrushchev to do at Camp David, once he realized the U.S. was not prepared to retreat? All he did was abandon a dangerous and expensive method for another that is 100% sure and costs nothing but time! Just "co-exist" for the time to 1963 and then rattle those 1500 ICBM's at us.*

The odds might be even less favorable to us; the West has always underestimated the capabilities of totalitarian dictatorship, and it may be doing so even now. By 1963, the Kremlin may have atomic subs surrounding our coasts as far inland as subs can go, armed with missiles capable of destroying our every city. It may have new inventions only dreamed of, or even undreamed of, today. It may have defenses against the dirtiest H-bombs that our economy-starved researchers haven't begun to think of.

But in any case, the Kremlin can count on free society being disorganized and paralyzed--by pacifists who wish we would surrender to Communism right now; by sharpies who are STILL doing business with the Kremlin and screaming for more business; by agonized scientists who have almost given up hope of racial survival (including me); and by humanitarians who are sure Communism will turn liberal if only U.S. war-mongers would quit frightening the Kremlin to death.

What will happen to our national will, in four years of "no-alternative" and two elections? We have gambled everything so many times on ever-benevolent Social Evolution, we forget that Social Evolution is also working on US.

(6) In conclusion: the CIA should consider unfavorable possibilities as well as favorable, and social evolution in this country as well as in Russia, as indications of where to look for significant information. It should not hesitate to question the most obvious axioms when they support the easy solution to terrible problems, and look for intelligence that might prove them untrue.

In fact, all America should ask itself: can hand-wringing and good intentions and aimless drifting pilot our Ship of State--or even our species--safely into port?

Respectfully,

Alfred B. Mason
Alfred B. Mason, M.D. (ØBK, Chicago, 1938)

* This particular thought was discussed among us here at home before Camp David.